#### Presidential war powers come not from our judicial or legislative institutions, but from aesthetic performances – this allows the president to expand the scope of presidential power while seemingly decreasing it

Dudziak ’12 (2/17 Mary L – a professor of law, history and political science at the University of Southern California, is the author of “War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences.”) “How Presidential War Power is Made, or why rhetoric matters to war powers” http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/how-presidential-war-power-is-made-or.html

Over at Lawfare, Benjamin Wittes found my op-ed in yesterday’s New York Times, on Obama’s double-take on the nature of our current war era, to be “perplexing.” Let me say a few words that are unlikely to lead Wittes and me to agree on everything, but at least might help crystalize what the disagreement is about. I should also say that I tend to agree with one of the underlying ideas at Lawfare, as I understand their project, and that Mark Tushnet has also made: “liberals” and “conservatives” are often talking past each other on questions of national security, and there is a need to reshift the conversation, and get beyond partisan and left/right divides. The most essential point is methodological (and if you’re looking for the direct points about my op-ed/Wittes’ post, skip ahead a couple of paragraphs). As legal scholars we tend to focus especially on law, of course. Law and society scholars, including legal historians like me, study law by going beyond it – by studying law in a broader historical and cultural context. Law exists as part of and in relation to society and culture, so that we can’t fully see law without understanding the way it is produced and understood – socially, politically, culturally. Like other legal problems, law related to war and security is a law-and-society subject. Many very smart war powers and national security law specialists have been drilling down on the complex legal issues related to the post-9/11 context, an effort that Lawfare contributes to. But as with all legal issues, there is also a law-and-society component. Although war powers and national security scholarship often draws upon historical examples, the scholarship does not tend to incorporate current important work by historians and others related to war and security. So, in my view, the law-and-society aspect of legal war and security studies is underdeveloped. Alongside of the current focus on national security law in American law schools, we need, essentially, law-and-society law & security. How does that relate to my op-ed? My piece is about Obama’s political rhetoric related to war, and I argue that he is trying to have it both ways. As a political matter, he has focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His campaign promise was to bring these wars to an end. Early in his administration he would say “we’re in two wars.” But in 2010 he shifted, and gave a speech that said the nation is “at war with Al Qaeda.” This shift in political rhetoric enables the president to argue that he is filling his campaign promise of ending the wars that he was talking about when he got elected, but at the same time the new formulation maintains (politically) the basis for his war-related powers. Now for the law-and-society point: presidential war powers are determined not only by legal authorities and constraints, to the extent they exist, and by capacities inherent in the executive branch. As Scott Silliman put it in a national security law class at Duke last semester, the president “paints the scene.” Important work by historians helps to fill in the way presidents essentially narrate wars for the American public (my formulation, not Silliman’s), helping to generate both political sentiment and also, most simply, the conception that something happening faraway is a “war” that the security of Americans at home hinges upon. (This is not a post-9/11 problem, but was a critical Cold War issue, and also was important in earlier years.) Political scientist Adam Berinsky helps us to see that what Americans “know” about overseas conflict does not derive directly from the conflict itself, but is filtered in the same way as public opinion on other matters: it is affected by elite discourse and partisan politics. This is a long way of saying that presidential rhetoric on war and security is tremendously important and consequential. I focused only on Obama’s flip: “Ending major conflicts in two countries helps him deliver on campaign promises. But his expansive definition of war leaves in place the executive power to detain without charges, and to exercise war powers in any region where Al Qaeda has a presence.” But the ultimate problem goes beyond what looks like a political bait-and-switch. By narrating war differently, Obama is “painting the scene” differently, in a way that will not determine the scope of his war-related powers down the road, including but not limited to detention. Though not determinative, a president’s framing of a war era is a first and essential component of the generation and maintenance of presidential war powers. I take up Wittes directly, and the ways we’re talking past each other, below the fold. Wittes makes this point (emphasis added): With respect to the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States still has troops deployed in Afghanistan who are actively fighting Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces on a daily basis. Whatever the point at which hostilities can reasonably be said to be over for purposes of conveying detention authority, we are nowhere near that point yet. And critically, I don't know anyone in the Obama administration who would argue that detention authority will persist after hostilities really are over-any more than we took our prisoners with us when we left Iraq. Indeed, if the negotiations with the Taliban that are now getting started were to produce a peace deal, it's hard for me to imagine that detention authority would persist vis a vis Taliban detainees. It’s the starting point that matters: “with respect to the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.” The “war” against Al Qaeda is a different way of saying “war on terror,” though it is at least a more specific form of a “war on terror.” (Wittes includes the Taliban, but Obama’s framing is not so limited, or at least not consistently limited.) The reason for the parallel is that President Bush’s “war on terror” was a conceptualization that had no limits in space or time. The potentially unlimited nature of that sort of conflict, and the way it might justify detention without end, has troubled the Supreme Court. In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor noted that Hamdi was arguing that he potentially faced “the substantial prospect of perpetual detention.” But she reasoned that the Court did not have to face the prospect of endless detention, because, in essence, the war in Afghanistan looked like an old fashioned war, limited in space and time. There were “active combat operations” against the Taliban in Afghanistan, so it was appropriate to detain Hamdi “for the duration of these hostilities.” The “war against Al Qaeda” – Obama’s formulation as of 2010 – is not limited in space and time the way a war in Afghanistan – Obama’s earlier formulation – could be. There is more to say about all of this, some of it covered in my new book, but Wittes states: "Dudziak's implicit argument seems to me altogether perverse. She seems to be saying that in a conflict in which literally tens of thousands are actively fighting today, detention authority must ebb because the government hopes aspires to wind things down. That can't be right." At this point, we are talking past each other, a consequence that, as I understand it, is one of Lawfare’s goals to avoid. Wittes is arguing that there is legal authority for detention. I’m not affirming or disputing the question of the legal limits of detention power. I’m talking about something else: presidential war rhetoric, a matter of great importance to presidential war power. My call is simply for transparency if not consistency. And so Wittes misses the op-ed’s point about Obama’s political rhetoric, and then draws a mistaken implication from that misreading. If he might complain that I could have been clearer, of course the response in part is: it was in a newspaper, with a word limit. But if he believes that I helped produce the misreading, let me just say mea culpa. And now let’s get back to trying to understand war and security in a deeper way, across ideological lines, and – one of my arguments generally – in a more nuanced and interdisciplinary way.

#### This aesthetic standard within the presidency, does not manifest itself in objective terms, rather is functions to interpret our standards of beauty, pervading all analysis of intellectual criticism

Buruma 12 professor of democracy and human rights at Bard College, doctorate in theology (Ian, 10/10/12, “Beauty and campaigning for the American presidency,” http://www.praguepost.com/opinion/14488-beauty-and-campaigning-for-the-american-presidency.html, RBatra)

What is the point of a presidential debate? In the context of American presidential elections, "debate" is something of a misnomer. When former French President Nicolas Sarkozy faced his Socialist challenger, François Hollande, that was a debate - addressing substantive issues and lasting more than two hours. By contrast, presidential debates in the United States are more like staged performances, where the answers to every possible question have been rehearsed endlessly with teams of coaches and advisers. The candidates in U.S. debates address carefully selected journalists who rarely follow up on a question. And the candidates' performances are scrutinized less on the substance of their arguments than on their presentation, body language, facial tics, unguarded sighs, smiles, sneers and inadvertent eye rolling. Does the candidate come across as a snob or a friendly guy whom one can trust? Do the smiles look real or fake? These "optics" can be of great importance. After all, Richard Nixon's race against John Kennedy in 1960 is said to have been lost on television: Kennedy looked cool and handsome, while Nixon scowled into the camera, with sweat trickling down his 5 o'clock shadow. In his debates with Ronald Reagan in 1980, Jimmy Carter came across as smug and humorless and Reagan as a friendly old uncle. Carter lost. In 2000, Al Gore was unable to make up his mind about which role he wished to play in his debates with George W. Bush, so he looked shifty and inauthentic, changing from arrogant to patronizing and back again. He had the better arguments, but he lost the "debates" (and the election) nonetheless. We are told that the debates this month between President Barack Obama and the Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, might decide the election. It is, according to the pundits, Romney's last chance. If Obama comes across as an elitist professor, he might lose. If Romney gets angry or makes a bad joke, his chances could be blown. Again, this is not a question of who has the best policies, or the soundest ideas; it is all about presentation. More than 67 million Americans watched the first of this year's three debates. According to public opinion polls, only about 17 percent of eligible voters have not yet made up their minds about which candidate to support. That is surprising, given the widening political gap between America's two main political parties. In private, Obama and Romney may be able to agree on many things. But the Republican Party has moved far to the right of Obama's moderate liberalism, and Romney has been pulled along with it. Then there is the great unspoken factor of racial prejudice, something even hard-core right-wing Republicans try not to express openly. A certain percentage of American voters will not vote for a black man, whatever he says or however good he looks in a debate. If policies or prejudices have not persuaded that undecided 17 percent of voters, they must be looking for something else. They want to see whether they like one man better than the other. To them, one can only assume, the debates are nothing more than a personality contest. In past elections, when there sometimes really was not much political difference between Democrats and Republicans, this made a certain sense. Broadly speaking, on economics and foreign policy, the candidates often would be in accord, with Republicans more inclined to favor the interests of big business and Democrats defending the interests of labor. So voters could not always be blamed for finding it hard to make up their minds. Since they could not make a rational choice, they followed their instincts and voted for the candidate they found most sympathetic. This time, there seems to be much less justification for such arbitrary choices. The political differences are too stark. And yet there is a reason not to dismiss the personality contest entirely. After all, the U.S. presidency is a quasi-monarchical institution, as well as a political one. The president and first lady are the king and queen of the American republic, the official faces that the U.S. presents to the outside world. It is not utterly absurd, therefore, that voters want to like the look of their presidents, quite apart from the merit of their policies. Choosing the country's most powerful politician on the basis of his presentability on television might seem arbitrary, even frivolous. But it is no more arbitrary than the accident of birth, which determines the right of kings and queens to reign over their countries. The difference is, of course, that most modern kings and queens are constitutional monarchs with no political power. And the man whom U.S. voters choose to lead their country will affect the lives of everyone, not just Americans. Because non-Americans cannot vote in U.S. elections (a pity for Obama, who would probably win a global vote by a landslide), we have to depend on the judgment of that 17 percent of undecided voters watching television this month. That is not exactly reassuring. But the American republic has one merit that monarchies lack. Good or bad, the quasi-king can be booted out every four years. Then the competition - part ideological, part beauty contest - can start all over again.

#### This ugly/beauty binary extends beyond the presidency, acting as a fluctuating category it negatively codes populations in order to exclude

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

Hierarchical Binaries: Beauty/Ugliness and All the ¶ Rest ¶ In a peculiar sense we all know what “the ugly‟ is through intuition. ¶ But in another sense, ugliness exceeds descriptions. As Nina ¶ Athanassoglou-Kallmyer adroitly discusses, ugliness has often ¶ “served as the all-purpose repository for everything that [does] not ¶ quite fit‟, it has served as a marker of “mundane reality, the irrational, evil, disorder, dissonance, irregularity, excess, deformity, ¶ the marginal: in short, the Other‟ (2003, p.281, emphasis added). ¶ While ugliness is a fluctuating category, contingent upon specific ¶ contexts and norms, it is certainly established as the negatively ¶ coded half of the beauty/ugliness binary. ¶ Binaries such as beauty/ugliness are ugly in themselves ¶ because they are not simple horizontal couplings, they are “never the ¶ face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy and an order of ¶ subordination‟ (Derrida 1982, p.329). I have chosen to refer to them ¶ as hierarchical binaries to flag this “order of subordination‟ and ¶ likewise “order of privilege‟ (p.329). Also, it is never the case that ¶ binaries exist in isolation, rather they tend to map onto other binaries ¶ In predictable ways, forming interlocked binary-crystals – ¶ ¶ It is not just male and female, masculine and feminine, ¶ or nature and culture, but also town and country, matter ¶ and spirit, body and mind, capitalist and worker – our ¶ entire philosophical set describes natural and social ¶ phenomena in terms of oppositional characteristics. ¶ (Jordanova 1999, p.37) ¶ ¶ Beauty/ugliness thus never operate independently, but map onto ¶ race, class, and gender, forming a network through which we can ¶ discriminate, incriminate, and render ugly. Yeidy Rivero, in her ¶ consideration of the Colombian sitcom Yo soy Betty la Fea (the ¶ precursor to ABC’s Ugly Betty) agrees, indicating that “the ¶ dichotomy between “beautiful‟ and “ugly‟ […] is broadly informed ¶ by intertwined Eurocentric, patriarchal, racial, ¶ Western/Christianized ideologies‟ (2003, p.68, emphasis added). ¶ Some of the specific binaries that most readily interlock with ¶ beauty/ugliness include: self/other, man/woman, human/animal, ¶ organism/machine, real/fake, white/black, rich/poor, clean/dirty, ¶ able/disabled, whole/fractured, young/old, healthy/ill, thin/fat, tall/short, smooth/rough, regular/irregular, pure/mixed and ¶ perfect/imperfect. ¶ Donna Haraway emphasizes that binaries serve as formulas ¶ for domination, that “they [are] systemic to the logics and practices ¶ of domination […] domination of all constituted as others‟ (1991, ¶ p.392). Territories of ugliness can be occupied by an arrangement of ¶ individuals, by anyone who does not easily comply with prescribed ¶ norms of appearance and behaviour. Thus, whenever the label of ¶ “ugly‟ is applied (or any one of its multiple synonyms i.e. hideous, ¶ grotesque, repulsive, plain or monstrous), we can be sure that it is ¶ referring to whatever is “other‟ in our culture. So, while there are no ¶ essential features that all ugly bodies share, they do share territories ¶ external to dominance and privilege. As Butler points out, ¶ “unlivable‟, “uninhabitable‟ zones, such as those occupied by the ¶ “ugly‟, are needed to “circumscribe the domain of the subject‟ (1993, ¶ p.2-3). Ugliness thus provides zones of “disidentification‟ that ¶ subjects of “beauty‟ are reliant on (p.4).

#### Aesthetic tendencies mirror the way that political practices operate – It’s no surprise that the dominant group is the one that gets to define beauty – this has historically been used as a tool to marginalize and otherize

Craig 2k6 (Maxine, “Race, beauty, and the tangled knot of a guilty pleasure” Feminist Theory 2006 7: 159)

Discourses of race and beauty are often intertwined. Racist ideologies commonly promote the appearance of the dominant group against the purported ugliness of a subordinate group. When, in his ‘Notes on the State of Virginia’ Thomas Jefferson sought to defend a continued separation of the races, he pointed to what he considered the self-evident beauty of whites (Jefferson, 1975: 187). Likewise, Nazis used assertions of superior Aryan beauty to build anti-Semitism (Mosse, 1985: 139). Claims of beauty have also been central to anti-racist resistance. When Marcus Garvey built a mass African-American movement in the early 20th century, he implored black people to ‘take down the pictures of white women from your walls. Elevate your own women to that place of honor’ (Garvey, 1968: 29). In Garvey’s nationalist rhetoric, racial pride began with an appreciation of the beauty of black women. Despite the close connections between discourses of beauty and racial politics, race has often been left out of feminist analyses of beauty. If we take the 1968 Miss America pageant protest as a historical beginning point for second wave feminist activist critiques of beauty regimes in the United States, we can see that an analysis of the interpenetration of racism and beauty regimes was present at the beginning. The organizers of the 1968 Miss America contest protest decried the racial exclusivity of the pageant, noting that there had never been a black finalist nor a single Puerto Rican, Alaskan, Hawaiian or Mexican-American winner (Morgan, 1970: 586). Though early activists found and critiqued racism and sexism in institutions of beauty, an analysis of race escaped some of the most widely read academic feminist writing on beauty that followed. This section traces the presence, absence and reappearance of race in feminist theories of beauty. My account cannot be strictly chronological, as in some cases early writers and activists had greater sensitivity to issues of race than writers who followed them. In this narrative, I organize the works considered into those that are foundational, those that engaged in a project of specifying differences in women’s experiences of beauty, and those that complicated existing theory by addressing questions of agency. Given the wealth of feminist writing relating to beauty, this survey is necessarily incomplete and will inevitably omit important work. Works are included here because they articulate central tendencies within the literature. Lois Banner’s 1983 American Beauty laid important historical groundwork for subsequent feminist scholarship on beauty. By chronicling the transformation of beauty standards in the United States, Banner demonstrated the constructed and historically specific character of ideals of beauty. As written by Banner, however, beauty’s American history is a white women’s history. Joan Jacobs Brumberg’s study of decades of young women’s diaries documents the way that the expansion of marketing to young women increased women’s self-consciousness regarding their bodies. Given that women who have enjoyed certain privileges are more likely to keep diaries and have them collected by archives, the experience documented in Brumberg’s study was primarily that lived by white middle- and upper-class women. Nonetheless, Brumberg’s 1997 The Body Project importantly challenged the common assumption that young women have always been anxious about the appearance of their bodies. Young women’s diaries written in the 19th century were less focused on outer beauty. As the reach of marketing increased throughout the 20th century, young women were more likely to write about their bodies in their diaries and more frequently expressed dissatisfaction with their shapes and weight. Published in the 1980s, essays by Iris Marion Young and Sandra Lee Bartky were also foundational.1 Young and Bartky articulated feminist analyses of women’s beauty work as a disciplinary practice policed by the force of a coercive and pervasive male gaze. These works were indispensable for later feminist writing and practice relating to beauty, yet the woman who was their subject was a racially unmarked, implicitly heterosexual woman of an unspecified class. In Young’s essay ‘Throwing Like a Girl’, the essence of the female experience is a physical passivity caused by ‘the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and intention’ (Young, 1980: 154). Women take up the view of themselves as things ‘looked at and acted upon’, and use cosmetics, diets, and other disciplinary practices in attempts to craft themselves into more beautiful things (Young, 1980: 148). In this argument, a woman sees herself as men see her, and the embodied actions a woman takes are usurped by male intentions. She acts upon herself to realize the will of a generalized male gaze. From the present vantage point, Young’s argument appears not incorrect but incomplete. Young’s essay vividly describes and explains the selfconsciousness regarding appearance that male domination imposes on women. Whether measured by the grossly disproportionate amounts of money spent by women on beauty care or the higher rates of eating disorders and cosmetic surgery use among women, it is clear that women, as a group, work to change their appearance more than men do. The feelings of inadequacy produced by the presence of beauty standards in women’s lives are, arguably, among the most personal manifestations of gender inequality in our lives. That being said, the essential woman she describes is that racially unmarked, implicitly heterosexual woman, of unspecified class. Connected to no community, she stands alone under the male gaze. The gazing male is similarly unspecified. What happens if we rethink the argument, with the understanding that the woman under the gaze has a race, a sexual identity, an age, abilities, and more or less wealth? Does she still stand alone in relation to the gaze? Which techniques of transformation are available to her, which are impossible, and what are the meanings of those techniques within her community? When, and if, she sees herself through the eyes of a male, what is his race and how does his race affect her assumptions about what he sees? Is he also the target of an objectifying gaze? Sandra Lee Bartky similarly describes beauty work as a product of the female self-surveillance that arises from the male gaze. Yet she describes the beautifying woman as active rather than passive. According to Bartky, women actively construct feminine selves, the only selves that patriarchal regimes support, or risk the ‘annihilation’ that awaits those who refuse to embrace socially acceptable subjectivities (Bartky, 1988: 78). Bartky’s self-monitoring women, like Young’s, are generalized women who stand alone. Each woman, because she is not envisioned as a member of any social group based on race, class, age, sexuality, or ability, is equally alone, and subject to a generalized male gaze. Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing to the present, a sizeable group of scholars has engaged in a project of specifying, in various ways, women’s experiences of beauty standards. These works document and analyse the racism inherent in dominant beauty standards (Banet-Weiser, 1999; Banks, 2000; Bordo, 1993; Candelario, 2000; Chapkis, 1986; Craig, 2002; DuCille, 1996; Espiritu, 1997; Gilman, 1985; Hobson, 2003; Kaw, 2003; Lakoff and Scherr, 1984; Peiss, 1998; Weitz, 2004). Focusing on the diverse and particular ways that dominant beauty standards positioned white, black, and Asian women, these scholars argue that beauty standards maintained racial inequality as well as gender inequality. Much of this scholarship addressed the polarized positions of black women and white women in dominant beauty regimes. Dominant beauty standards that idealized fair skin, small noses and lips, and long flowing hair defined black women’s dark skin colour, facial features, and tightly curled, short hair as ugly. In many, but not all representations, black women’s bodies were also stigmatized as hypersexual, a characterization that positioned black women as the moral opposites of pure white women. The ordeal of Saartjie Baartman, the black South African woman who was transported to London and Paris in 1810 and exhibited barely clothed as an entertaining spectacle, is emblematic of the abusive representation of black women as the hypersexual other (Gilman, 1985). Saartjie Baartman was dubbed the ‘Hottentot Venus’, a name that identified her as a stigmatizing symbol of beauty for a defamed group within a colonial context (Hobson, 2003). The exclusion of non-white women, or their marginalization within representations of beauty, supported the place of white women within beauty regimes. That is, racists defined white and chaste beauty in opposition to the imputed ugliness and hypersexuality of other, racially marked, groups of women (Collins, 2004; hooks, 1992; Omolade, 1983). Writers who have considered the position of contemporary non-white women in beauty regimes have variously found categorical exclusion of women of colour, appreciation of the beauty of women of colour to the extent that they approached the appearance of whiteness, or the inclusion of a changing spectrum of women of colour in the marginalized and marked position of the exotic beauty. A shifting economic and geopolitical context underlies these alternative and unstable positions of women of colour in beauty regimes. Asian women were portrayed as monstrous in 19th-century caricatures drawn by whites engaged in nativist politics. In later periods, when exclusionary immigration laws removed Asian workers from competition with American workers, Asian women were represented as exotic beauties (Espiritu, 1997). African-American women, who were categorically excluded from representations of beauty prior to the Civil Rights Movement, have, within the past forty years, along with the emergence of a sizeable black middle class, gained inclusion in fashion industry and cinematic representations of beauty, albeit often in ways that continue to mark them as exotic (DuCille, 1996). Among these authors Susan Bordo provides the broadest theoretical basis for understanding how beauty regimes locate women in specific valued or devalued positions. She argues that representations of beauty produce norms for women, ‘against which the self continually measures, judges, “disciplines,” and “corrects” itself’ (Bordo, 1993: 25). Her argument was more than a restatement of that advanced by Bartky and Young, because of Bordo’s sustained consideration of the ways that race matters in women’s experience of dominant beauty standards. Racism and sexism intertwine in the form of a normalizing discourse that marks women of colour as abnormal and thus flawed.

#### Beauty standards’ reliance on bodily difference create classes of monsters perpetually used to oppress and eliminate entire populations

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

Ugly Specimen II: The Monstrous Body ¶ Monstrosity denotes anything that is horrifying, ambiguous, or ¶ hybridized, “the in between, the mixed, the ambivalent‟ (Braidotti ¶ 1997, p.61). Monstrosity may be characterized by excess or ¶ absence; it is ¶ excess, lack, or displacement […] [t]here can be too ¶ many parts or too few; the right ones in the wrong ¶ places or duplicated at random. (Braidotti 1999, p.290) ¶ Monsters are also unpredictable; it “will never be known what the ¶ next monster is going to look like‟, it “moves, flows, changes‟ ¶ (1999, p.300). Thus, like ugliness, the monstrous is culturally ¶ contingent, reflecting cultural anxieties, fears, and fascinations. It is ¶ a category of ambivalence, “both horrible and wonderful, object of ¶ aberration and adoration‟ (1997, p.61-62). Finally, monsters share ¶ with one another an inherent capacity to blur boundaries and ¶ binaries. ¶ Many monsters are category errors; they contradict ¶ standing cultural concepts. They may be living and dead ¶ at the same time […] or they may be incongruous ¶ fusions of the animate and inanimate. (Carroll 2000, ¶ p.40) ¶ Because they do not at all fit into binary oppositions but rather occupy ambiguous spaces in between, monsters also imply that pre- established categories are a farce, and altogether useless. In this sense, monsters are themselves “failed repetitions‟, “de-formities‟, they are embodied failures of re-production (Butler, 2006, p.173, 179).¶ But I wish to emphasize that monsters are both representations and actual bodies. For instance, women are particularly monstrous, because their bodies are subject to dramatic changes in pregnancy and childbirth. Women’s bodies deny a set form and are prone to leaking and transforming, they are “morphologically dubious‟ (Braidotti 1997, p.64). Also, monsters are tied to the feminine because a search for their origin always leads to the maternal body (Braidotti, 1999, p.291). Women’s monstrous bodies can only be understood in the context of hierarchical binaries, which privilege the fantasy of a whole, impermeable male subject at the price of a perceived leaky, unstable woman’s body. The monstrous body is feared because it does not conform to binarical systems. It exists in the interstices of binaries, between categories. For instance, woman’s body at childbirth denies easy binary divisions confusing inside/outside and self/other; it is a confusion of two bodies, which were recently one. Women’s bodies, as sites of binary and boundary blurring are “ugly‟ and disturbing.¶ Like women, “racialized‟ bodies are likewise often figured in terms of ugly monstrosity. Nöel Carroll speculates that “nonbeauty [ugliness] [...] is somehow an inadequate instantiation of the concept of human being‟ which, when applied to “racial others‟, is indicative of them figuring as “beneath or outside ethics‟ (2000, p.37, 52). Ugliness here becomes a mark of racial sub-humanity or “primitivism‟. One specific historical instance of the application of “monstrosity‟ and “ugliness‟ to an actual black body is the case of Saartjie Baartman (anglicized as Sarah Bartman), the “Hottentot Venus‟. Originally from the cape of South Africa, Baartman was brought to London in 1810 to be publically displayed on account of her large buttocks, which was medically stigmatized as “steatopygia‟ (Hobson 2003, p.88). Janell Hobson emphasizes that the popularity of the London and Paris shows, which featured Baartman, is a result of the performative situating of her as a “freak‟ (2003, p.90). Significantly, Baartman was regarded as emblematic of black women in general and “Baartman [...] came to signify the “ugliness” of her race‟ (2003, p.94, emphasis in original). Anne Fausto- Sterling likewise observes that Baartman’s popularity as a “specimen‟ or “spectacle‟ was possible because of current-day anxieties about women and the “savage other‟ (2001, p.361). Thus, Baartman’s perceived monstrous ugliness was part and parcel of the larger mechanisms of colonization and racism. Understanding black bodies, such as Baartman’s, as “ugly‟ allowed them to be exploited without moral regret, since their monstrosity enabled them to be viewed as subhuman, “beneath or outside ethics‟ (Carroll 2000, p.52). Interestingly, Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai observe that labels of monstrosity are similarly deployed against Muslims in the post- September 11 context to justify politics of racial hatred and quarantining:¶ The monsters that haunt the prose of contemporary counterterrorism emerge out of figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that have always been racialized, classed, and sexualized. The undesirable, the vagrant, the Gypsy, the savage, the Hottentot Venus [...] shares a basic kinship with the terrorist-monster. (2002, p.124) Bodies which we perceive as monstrously ugly also include those disfigured by illness or circumstance. According to Braidotti, such productions of monstrosity are connected to environmental, technological, or toxicity-based causes (1999, p.292). Again, these bodies are perceived as monstrous and ugly not because they are “aesthetically displeasing‟ but because they are jarring, because they unsettle hierarchical binaries through inhabiting ambiguous spaces in between. As Wendell argues, in the context of the visibly disabled, such bodies are “constant reminders to those who are currently measuring up that they might slip outside the standards‟ (2009, p.247). Thus not only do they blur binaries and boundaries, but disfigured bodies also remind us of the impermanence of life, the reality of mortality, and the fact that sooner or later each one of us will become “ugly;‟¶ “everyone who does not die suddenly will become a member of the subordinated group‟ (p.249, emphasis in original). Charles Feitosa, in an unpublished essay, puts it even more bluntly: “[w]e oppose ugliness as we oppose death; in opposing ugliness we are fighting against our own mortality‟ ([n.d.], p.4).¶ Monstrous ugliness is thus in a certain way, the most disheveling ugliness, an ugliness with the greatest power to shock. The ugliness of monstrosity and monstrous bodies is politically transgressive in two senses. First, it serves as an index for global and personal traumas (wars, pollution, and illness). Thus it is an embodied sign reminding us of various illnesses, viruses, and political unrest. Second, it reminds us of our own mortality, and the inability to remain “beautiful‟ permanently. In this way it demonstrates the regulatory aspect of normative ideals, the actual impossibility of conforming to these ideals, and the limits of hierarchical binaries. Monstrous bodies are ugly because they resist simple classification and demonstrate the limits of systems of classification (such as binaries). Also, monstrous bodies serve as embodiments of failed performativity. They actually are living reminders of the “regulatory fiction‟ of body and beauty ideals (Butler 2006, p.185).

#### Vote affirmative to affirm ugly.

#### Beauty as a concept allows for violence. The affirmative takes the vital step of confronting the ugly/beautiful binary to dismantle and challenge its power. This functions to reclaim and transform aesthetics to affirm the perspectives of the ugly

Mingus 2011 (Mia, Full text of a keynote address for the Femmes of Colour symposium, queer physically disabled woman of color, korean transracial and transnational adoptee writer and organizer “moving towards the ugly” http://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/moving-toward-the-ugly-a-politic-beyond-desirability/)

As femmes of color—however we identify—we have to push ourselves to go deeper than consumerism, ableism, transphobia and building a politic of desirability. Especially as femmes of color. We cannot leave our folks behind, just to join the femmes of color contingent in the giant white femme parade. As the (generational) effects of global capitalism, genocide, violence, oppression and trauma settle into our bodies, we must build new understandings of bodies and gender that can reflect our histories and our resiliency, not our oppressor or our self-shame and loathing. We must shift from a politic of desirability and beauty to a politic of ugly and magnificence. That moves us closer to bodies and movements that disrupt, dismantle, disturb. Bodies and movements ready to throw down and create a different way for all of us, not just some of us. [\*share North Carolina story] The magnificence of a body that shakes, spills out, takes up space, needs help, moseys, slinks, limps, drools, rocks, curls over on itself. The magnificence of a body that doesn’t get to choose when to go to the bathroom, let alone which bathroom to use. A body that doesn’t get to choose what to wear in the morning, what hairstyle to sport, how they’re going to move or stand, or what time they’re going to bed. The magnificence of bodies that have been coded, not just undesirable and ugly, but un-human. The magnificence of bodies that are understanding gender in far more complex ways than I could explain in an hour. Moving beyond a politic of desirability to loving the ugly. Respecting Ugly for how it has shaped us and been exiled. Seeing its power and magic, seeing the reasons it has been feared. Seeing it for what it is: some of our greatest strength. Because we all do it. We all run from the ugly. And the farther we run from it, the more we stigmatize it and the more power we give beauty. Our communities are obsessed with being beautiful and gorgeous and hot. What would it mean if we were ugly? What would it mean if we didn’t run from our own ugliness or each other’s? How do we take the sting out of “ugly?” What would it mean to acknowledge our ugliness for all it has given us, how it has shaped our brilliance and taught us about how we never want to make anyone else feel? What would it take for us to be able to risk being ugly, in whatever that means for us. What would happen if we stopped apologizing for our ugly, stopped being ashamed of it? What if we let go of being beautiful, stopped chasing “pretty,” stopped sucking in and shrinking and spending enormous amounts of money and time on things that don’t make us magnificent? Where is the Ugly in you? What is it trying to teach you? And I am not saying it is easy to be ugly without apology. It is hard as fuck. It threatens our survival. I recognize the brilliance in our instinct to move toward beauty and desirability. And it takes time and for some of us it may be impossible. I know it is complicated. …And I also know that though it may be a way to survive, it will not be a way to thrive, to grow the kind of genders and world we need. And it is not attainable to everyone, even those who want it to be. What do we do with bodies that can’t change no matter how much we dress them up or down; no matter how much we want them to? What about those of us who are freaks, in the most powerful sense of the word? Freakery is that piece of disability and ableism where bodies that are deformed, disfigured, scarred and non-normatively physically disabled live. Its roots come out of monsters and goblins and beasts; from the freak shows of the 1800’s where physically disabled folks, trans and gender non-conforming folks, indigenous folks and people of color were displayed side-by-side. It is where “beauty” and “freak” got constructed day in and day out, where “whiteness” and “other” got burned into our brains. It is part of the legacy of Ugly and it is part of my legacy as a queer disabled woman of color. It is a part of all of our history as queer people of color. It is how I know we must never let ourselves be on the side of the gawking crowd ever again in any way. It is the part of me that doesn’t show my leg. It is the part of me that knows that building my gender—my anything—around desirability or beauty is not just an ableist notion of what’s important, but will always keep me chasing what doesn’t want me. Will always keep me hurling swords at the very core of me. There is only the illusion of solace in beauty. If age and disability teach us anything, it is that investing in beauty will never set us free. Beauty has always been hurled as a weapon. It has always taken the form of an exclusive club; and supposed protection against violence, isolation and pain, but this is a myth. It is not true, even for those accepted in to the club. I don’t think we can reclaim beauty. Magnificence has always been with us. Always been there in the freak shows—staring back at the gawking crowd, in the back rooms of the brothels, in the fields fresh with cotton, on the street corners in the middle of the night, as the bombs drop, in our breaths after surviving the doctor’s office, crossing the border, in the first quiet moments of a bloody face after the attack is done. Magnificence was there. Magnificence was with me in the car rides home after long days being dehumanized, abused and steeled in the medical industrial complex. It was there with me when I took my first breaths in my mother’s arms in Korea, and a week later those first days alone without her realizing I wasn’t going home. Magnificence has always been with us. If we are ever unsure about what femme should be or how to be femme, we must move toward the ugly. Not just the ugly in ourselves, but the people and communities that are ugly, undesirable, unwanted, disposable, hidden, displaced. This is the only way that we will ever create a femme-ness that can hold physically disabled folks, dark skinned people, trans and gender non-conforming folks, poor and working class folks, HIV positive folks, people living in the global south and so many more of us who are the freaks, monsters, criminals, villains of our fairytales, movies, news stories, neighborhoods and world. This is our work as femmes of color: to take the notion of beauty (and most importantly the value placed upon it) and dismantle it (challenge it), not just in gender, but wherever it is being used to harm people, to exclude people, to shame people; as a justification for violence, colonization and genocide. If you leave with anything today, leave with this: you are magnificent. There is magnificence in our ugliness. There is power in it, far greater than beauty can ever wield. Work to not be afraid of the Ugly—in each other or ourselves. Work to learn from it, to value it. Know that every time we turn away from ugliness, we turn away from ourselves. And always remember this: I would rather you be magnificent, than beautiful, any day of the week. I would rather you be ugly—magnificently ugly.

#### This embrace of imperfection is the most decisive move for breaking the status quo aesthetic contract—it exposes fully the arbitrary ironies of status quo aesthetic domination, this act can reshape consciousness and create a dialogue that denies the universality of the dominant Aesthetic.

Taylor, 1998 [Clyde R. Taylor, film scholar and literary/cultural essayist, is Professor at the Gallatin School and in Africana Studies, New York University. His publications include Vietnam and Black America and the script for Midnight Ramble, a documentary about early Black independent cinema, “The Mask of Art—breaking the aesthetic contract” ]

Espinosa's argument furthers the critique of aestheticism and the art-culzture system. To accept the ironic imperfection of resistance may be the most decisive mental act for breaking the aesthetic contract. The differ­ence between "perfect" and "imperfect" cinema fully dramatizes the iro­nies of discourse. Espinosa's trope engages an irony where the value-meaning of an imperfect work is always located outside the zone where the judgments of quality are made. If cultural production outside the capitalized zone is categorically "im­perfect," then resistant works from this area are imperfect on two grounds. First, by their origination in an unapproved cultural context, and second by their direct opposition to the values of "quality," through various re-framing techniques. The burden of two codes of representation, one sup­ported, the other opposed, must be carried by practitioners of imperfect culture. More important, the frame of knowledge emerging from resis­tance is inescapably incomplete, a work-in-progress, unavoidably "ex­perimental," unsanctioned, lacking the grounding in approved tradition. The dialogue of "imperfection" underscores the ironies of domination as well as subordination. The description of the "perfect" embodies the process I have been calling "entelechy," through which an object may be known by its highest, most ideal development as opposed to its prema­ture or incomplete manifestation, as "man" is the entelechial fulfillment of "boy" in Aristotle's reasoning, or as, in the calculus of domination, "majority" is superior to "minority," Self to Other, Subject to Object, de­veloped to underdeveloped, literate to vernacular, capitalized phenomena over lower-case experience, literature to writing, art to folk art or crafts. The point where the, ironies raised by "perfect/imperfect" resonate most widely is in the framework of the narrative of mastery against the narra­tive of liberation. Recall the double-image illustration of the simultaneous pretty woman and the unattractive old woman, "My Wife and My Mother-in-Law." The pretty young woman is favored by the master narrative. She only needs to be male to qualify as its norm-hero, but lacking that, her prettiness makes her a fit object of that hero's desire and quest. The old lady is the young belle's alter ego, her co-defining Other. The perfections of the mas­ter narrative rely on the contrasting presence of imperfections, projected, as noted before, onto the maiden, the servant, the slave. In the schema of mastery, the presence of these incomplete types is necessary for the com­pletion of the perfect story. Even more necessary, of course is the essence of corruption and imperfection, the villain who, were the narrative to be recoded, might also be viewed as a tempter of the maiden, servant and slave to rebel, and in some revisions, might even be understood to be the hero to these Others and their interests. (I hope it is clear by now that I am improvising on the foundation of Espinosa's germinal ideas.) To develop "imperfect cinema" or narration as a concept means simply to work this irony into full consciousness. It is to recognize how imper­fection has been essentialized as a characteristic of any undertaking not authorized by the social structure. Once again we must recall that the master narrative is deployed to control the interpretation of meaning in historical experience as well as in cultural works. With its reiterated theme of the inevitable progress and dominance of the Western bourgeoi­sie, its goal is always to locate perfection in the technical slickness of its self-image on the screen as an index of its relative perfection in the world. Espinosa's figure of speech brings into daylight the hidden history whereby aestheticism has "imperfected" almost everything not favorably contributing to its self-image. We should understand that all cultural pro­duction outside of Occidental culture and mainstream Western popular culture is "imperfect.**"** All popular culture, all cultural expression pro­duced anywhere, as folklore or whatever, exists in the zone of imperfection. An occasional election occurs of an expressive form perceived as achiev­ing classical status in another culture, say, Noh plays in Japan, Chinese opera, traditional African sculptures, conferring honorary perfectibility on these forms (much as respected persons of color visiting apartheid South Africa were conferred "honorary White" status). But otherwise, imperfection is ordained merely by these expressions being Other, by not being in a European language, or by not having Western stars, or using a different musical scale, the characters in their narratives not rounded to the requirements of Euro-bourgeois individualism, or presenting dances that elude description according to the movement vocabulary of ballet, or celebrating a different history than that shaped around the triumph of the West, thereby producing only an inept caricature of modernity, if at all, or honoring different gods. It is also clear that the construction of the perfect in aesthetic humanism was partner to the fabrication of White­ness out of whiteness.

#### Embracing ugly abandons the binary allowing for an active, deconstruction of beauty.

Przybyło 2010 (Ela, currently completing a PhD in Women's Studies at York University, “The Politics of Ugliness” <http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_180322_en.pdf>)

Butler‟s „performativity‟, which acknowledges the necessarily laborious and repetitive nature of identity construction, is a meaningful way of thinking about both ugliness and deconstruction. It reminds us that binaries exist as long as we collectively and individually repeat them. If, on the other hand, we turn our back on binaries through turning them on their side, we partake in an active and strategic deconstructive process. Butler uses drag as the example par excellence of gender binary deconstruction, suggesting that the body in drag performs gender „differently‟ and thus engages in a temporary and dramatic binary confusion – „parodic repetition‟ (2006, p.186, 189). I see the possibility for ugliness to be also deployed in this way. Rivero observes this performative aspect of ugliness in the Colombian Ugly Betty, noting that ugliness is rendered in the sitcom as a „staged representation‟, „an impersonation‟ (2003, p.72). While the characters in the show shift from performances of „ugliness‟ to performances of „beauty‟ in problematic ways that suggest „everyone can be beautiful‟, the show unwittingly emphasizes the constructedness of beauty and ugliness.¶ Deploying ugliness strategically, in ways that engage in binary deconstruction, may take several forms. First, there is something already transgressive about the presence of „ugly‟ bodies in the public. Certain bodies in certain places function as „space invaders‟, according to Nirmal Puwar, because they disrupt the homogeneity of those spaces and challenge the position of the male body as the somatic norm (2004, p.67). Thus, the presence of a monstrous, dirty, or unaltered body in certain contexts is actually deconstructive and disruptive to binaries in itself. As Mary Russo, writing on the carnivalesque indicates,¶ in the everyday indicative world, women and their bodies, certain bodies, in certain public framings, in certain public spaces, are always transgressive –¶ dangerous, and in danger. (1997, p.323) Second, ugliness may be deployed strategically, through an active and exaggerated performance of ugliness in public spaces. Since the production of beauty requires not only a specific appearance but also a certain code of behaviours, feminists may strategically enact „ugly‟ behaviours as a means of deconstructing binaries such as beauty/ugliness, clean/dirty, public/private, and man/woman. Bartky refers to „disciplinary practices that produce a body which in gesture and appearance is recognizably feminine‟ (1990, p.65, emphasis added). These disciplinary practices function to prescribe the¶ body‟s sizes and contours, its appetite, posture, gestures and general comportment in space and the appearance of each of its visible parts. (p.80)¶ An excessive performance, performative confusion, or complete disregard of these normative behaviours and practices thus allows for a disruption of the conventions of beauty. Karina Eileraas, in „Witches, Bitches, and Fluids‟, explores the performed ugliness of punk and rock girl bands such as Hole. They deploy ugliness through ugly shrieks and wails (1997, p.127), ripped stockings and smudged make-up (p.129), ugly stage aggression (p.129), and the presence of ugly, dirty bodily fluids (p.132). In such ways, Eileraas argues, some girl bands perform ugliness, dismember femininity and normative feminine behaviours, and actively deconstruct spaces of beauty/ugliness and masculinity/femininity through „parad[ing], parrot[ing], and parody[ing]‟ (1997, p.135). It is exactly such multidimensional and excessive performances of ugliness, which create spaces of binary ambiguity and flux. Through acting ugly, and „doing‟ ugly, ugliness is privileged as a site of expression and as an effective feminist tool for unsettling prescriptive norms of behaviour.¶ Finally, ugliness can be deployed strategically through the very act of performative self-naming. At the beginning of this essay, I discussed Kincaid‟s strategy of deploying ugliness against neo- colonizers. Edwidge Danticat, on the other hand, provides an instance of the reappropriation or „embrace‟ of the category of ugliness through a deployment of it onto herself. Speaking of the multiple oppressions that Haitian women face, she rallies around a Haitian idiom:¶ we must scream this as far as the wind can carry our voices. “Nou lèd, nou la!” We are ugly, but we are here! (2003, p.27, emphasis added)¶ Through applying the label of ugliness onto herself (and „her people‟), Danticat immobilizes anyone who might want to hurt her by way of using the term „ugly‟ against her. She performs ugliness strategically, through „embracing‟ the category, deploying it in her own name, and reassembling it as something to be proud of. Acknowledging the political implications behind „ugliness‟ – such as racism, colonialism, sexism, and poverty – Danticat refuses to be immobilized by ugliness or by people who may use the term against her. Instead, she exploits it to her own uses, performs it, and deconstructs its meaning through reconfiguring it as a site of pride: as a site of presence, struggle, and endurance.

# 2AC

The ugly is, itself, ontological.

Zizek 1996 (Slavoj, “From desire to drive: Why Lacan is not Lacanian**”** http://zizek.livejournal.com/2266.html)

The Lacanian name for this "regulation of madness" is the symbolization of the real by means of which the formless, "ugly," real is (trans)formed into reality. Contrary to the standard idealist argument which conceives ugliness as the defective mode of beauty, as its distortion, one should assert the ontological primacy of ugliness: it is beauty which is a kind of defense against the Ugly in its repulsive existence or, rather, existence tout court, since, as we shall see, what is ugly is ultimately the brutal fact of existence (of the real) as such [4]. The ugly object is an object which is in the wrong place, which "shouldn't be there." This does not mean simply that the ugly object is no longer ugly the moment that we relocate it to its proper place; the point is rather that an ugly object is "in itself" out of place, on account of the distorted balance between its "representation" (the symbolic features we perceive) and "existence" - ugly, out of place, is the excess of existence over representation. Ugliness is thus a topological category; it designates an object which is in a way "larger than itself," whose existence is larger than its representation. The ontological presupposition of ugliness is therefore a gap between an object and the space it occupies, or - to make the same point in a different way - between the outside (surface) of an object (captured by its representation) and its inside (formless stuff). In the case of beauty, we have a perfect isomorphism in both respects, while in the case of ugliness, the inside of an object somehow is (appears) larger than the outside of its surface-representation (like the uncanny buildings in Kafka's novels which, once we enter them, appear much more voluminous than what they seemed when viewed from the outside). Another way to put it is to say that what makes an object "out of place" is that it is too close to me, like the Statue of Liberty in Hitchcock's Foreign Correspondent: seen from the extreme proximity, it loses its dignity and acquires disgusting, obscene features. In courtly love, the figure of die Frau-Welt obeys the same logic: she appears beautiful from the proper distance, but the moment the poet or the knight serving her approaches her too closely (or when she asks him to come close to her so that she can repay him for his faithful service), she turns her other, reverse side to him, and what was previously the semblance of a fascinating beauty, is suddenly revealed as putrefied flesh, crawling with snakes and worms, the disgusting substance of life, as in the films of David Lynch, where an object turns into the disgusting substance of Life as soon as the camera gets too close to it. The gap that separates beauty from ugliness is thus the very gap that separates reality from the Real: the kernel of reality is horror, horror of the Real, and that which constitutes reality is the minimum of idealization which the subject needs in order to be able to sustain the Real. Another way to make the same point is to define ugliness as the excess of stuff which penetrates through the pores in the surface, from science-fiction aliens whose liquid materiality overwhelms their surfaces (see the evil alien in Terminator 2 or, of course, the alien from Alien itself), to the films of David Lynch (especially Dune), in which the raw flesh beneath the surface constantly threatens to emerge on the surface. In our standard phenomenological attitude towards the body of another person, we conceive the surface (of a face, for example) as directly expressing the "soul" - we suspend the knowledge of what actually exists beneath the skin surface (glands, flesh...). The shock of ugliness occurs when the surface is actually cut, opened up, so that the direct insight into the actual depth of the skinless flesh dispels the spiritual, immaterial, pseudo-depth. In the case of beauty, the outside of a thing - its surface - encloses and overcoats its interior, whereas in the case of ugliness, this proportionality is perturbed by the excess of the interior stuff which threatens to overwhelm and engulf the subject. This opens up the space for the opposite excess, that of something which is not there and should be, like the missing nose which makes the "phantom of the opera" so ugly. Here, we have the case of a lack which also functions as an excess, the excess of a ghostly, spectral materiality in search of a "proper," "real" body. Ghosts and vampires are shadowy forms in desperate search for the life-substance (blood) in us, actually existing humans. The excess of stuff is thus strictly correlative to the excess of spectral form: Deleuze has already pointed out how the "place without an object" is sustained by an "object lacking its proper place" - it is not possible for the two lacks to cancel each other. What we have here are the two aspects of the real, existence without properties and an object with properties without existence. Suffice it to recall the well-known scene from Terry Gilliam's Brasil, in which the waiter in a high-class restaurant recommends the best offers from the daily menu to his customers ("Today, our tournedos is really special!" etc.), yet, what the customers are given on making their choice is a dazzling color photo of the meal on a stand above the plate, and, on the plate itself, a loathsome excremental paste-like lump: this split between the image of the food and the real of its formless, excremental remainder perfectly exemplifies the two modes of ugliness, the ghost-like substanceless appearance ("representation without existence") and the raw stuff of the real ("existence without appearance"). One should not underestimate the weight of this gap, which separates the "ugly" Real from the fully-formed objects in "reality:" Lacan's fundamental thesis is that a minimum of "idealization," of the interposition of a fantasmatic frame by means of which the subject assumes a distance from the Real, is constitutive of our "sense of reality" - "reality" occurs insofar as it is not (it does

#### The negative forces the subject to position itself within the coercive demands of the state; this evades social explanations and limits action to the political. Only aesthetics situates the subject within a global network of bodies to break down multiple forms of oppression

Armstrong ’96 (Prof English @ UChicago) “"The Effects of Blackness": Gender, Race, and the Sublime in Aesthetic Theories of Burke and¶ Kant”

In the eighteenth century, largely through the in- ¶ fluence of an aesthetic treatise by Edmund Burke ¶ and the precritical aesthetics of Immanuel Kant, ¶ the sublime became both an effect of an object ¶ which inspired terror and the disposition of a ¶ subject capable of aesthetic judgment. What has ¶ not often been recognized in subsequent analy- ¶ ses of these texts is that in each the sublime is ¶ described not only through analogies to the dif- ¶ ferences between the sexes (Burke and Kant), but ¶ also as a product of an aesthetic disposition in- ¶ herent in sexual, national, and historical charac- ¶ teristics (Kant), and is sometimes provoked by ¶ images of racial difference (Burke and Kant). ¶ The description of the sublime in terms of cul- ¶ ture, race, nation, or gender ought now to be a ¶ highly remarkable feature of discussions of aes- ¶ thetics, particularly to the extent that it suggests ¶ that aesthetic discourse was not only integral to ¶ the construction of a "self-determining" bour- ¶ geois subject, but also that this subject was posi- ¶ tioned within growing discourses of difference in ¶ the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.4 There ¶ is, however, a provocative silence on the relation ¶ between the sublime and the exotic, and even the ¶ most insightful commentaries on the romantic ¶ sublime spawned by recent interests in decon- ¶ struction have neglected to mention the preva- ¶ lent association between the sublime and various, ¶ embodied, forms of difference.5 The reason for ¶ this is, perhaps, that the philosophical discourses ¶ of sublimity turn away from such embodied (and ¶ often "exotic") forms at the same time that they ¶ abjure the relevance of historical and cultural ¶ contingencies which have thrown them into the ¶ line of vision.6 The repetitive motions with which ¶ the national, cultural, racial, or gendered bodies ¶ of the sublime are erased in order to assert the ¶ "naturalness" of aesthetic vision indicates a per- ¶ sistent anxiety and ambivalence surrounding the ¶ relationship between subjectivity, aesthetics, and ¶ the production of images-one could even say ¶ stereotypes-of difference. ¶ Prior to Kant's third Critique, natural objects or ¶ "majestic scenes in nature" (mountains, oceans, ¶ vast spaces), sublime objects or phenomena ¶ which are suggestive of things not readily en- ¶ compassed, conceptualized, or represented, are ¶ joined by "culturally unintelligible" bodies and ¶ others. It is a cliche of criticism that romantic ¶ poets reformulated theologically transcendent ¶ ideas in natural symbolism, and that natural ob- ¶ jects and phenomena familiar in European coun- ¶ tries became emblems of sublimity in the secular ¶ imagination of lyric poets. What is not often ob- ¶ served in discussions of this reformulation is not ¶ simply that the naturalization also applies to its ¶ attachment to specific bodies but also that these ¶ bodies are often imported from foreign domains, ¶ "other" by virtue of racial or cultural differences, ¶ often from regions important to imperialistic designs of European empires.7 Yet, even if such ¶ bodies are initially "abject"-neither subject nor ¶ object-they quickly become subjected to an ¶ aesthetic discourse. By positioning the subject ¶ within a constellation of images of foreign bod- ¶ ies which compel sublime vision, the aesthetic ¶ uses these "abject" or "black bodies" to organize ¶ desires for difference while compelling the dis- ¶ avowal of the transgressive passions with which ¶ they are associated. The "ideology of the aes- ¶ thetic"8 is, then, not limited to the construction ¶ of a subject which must position itself within the ¶ coercive demands of the state. Rather, aesthetic ¶ discourse at least since Burke and Kant locates ¶ this subject within a global network of "bodies" ¶ (sensual signs of the sublime) whose gendered, ¶ national, and racial markings are integral to that ¶ subject's self-identification (if not also its unspo- ¶ ken or illegitimate desires). ¶ The difficulties inherent in this double ma- ¶ neuver may be part of the reason why sublimity, ¶ though inspiring awe or wonder, is not always ¶ thought particularly pleasing, and is a site of ex- ¶ treme ambivalence. The discomfort instigated ¶ by the sublime (as aesthetic artifact and as aes- ¶ thetic discourse) might be read as a tension be- ¶ tween two somewhat conflicting and competing ¶ possibilities. First, according to a "transcendent" ¶ interpretation of the sublime which buys into ¶ the rhetoric of philosophical aesthetics, sublime ¶ vision is problematic because it harbors within ¶ itself the contradictions and regret which arise ¶ from confrontations with difference and the in- ¶ evitable failure of aesthetic discourse to satisfy ¶ desires for totality and unity. In the rhetorical ¶ heart of sublime vision is the awareness that ¶ prior to this visionary totality there is a break or ¶ rupture between the ideal of the whole and the ¶ incoherent experiences of the real. The task of the ¶ aesthetic might be, then, to create a provisional ¶ resolution for this breach. For instance, the sub- ¶ lime could be an emblem of the superiority of ¶ reason (as an indication of the supersensible in ¶ man), exemplifying unity, mastery, and control ¶ of frightening or alien aspects of the natural ¶ world,9 as it was in Kant's third Critique. It ¶ could be an image of unity with a deity, or, ¶ strictly subjectively, the union of rational and ¶ imaginative faculties. Or, the sublime could be the mark of noble feelings in particular races ¶ in Kant's precritical aesthetics such nobility was ¶ attributed to "Englishmen." But on a more mel- ¶ ancholy note, the sublime might approach the ¶ apocalyptic vision of some Romantic painters, ¶ the Burkean terror-filled sublime, a threat to vi- ¶ sions of totality, or a broken unity between crea- ¶ ture (most often masculine) and deity or the ¶ natural world, sometimes suggesting a mark ¶ of permanent difference, exile, and alienation. ¶ And, for Burke, this negative, melancholy mark ¶ of the sublime could be aptly (and uncritically) ¶ allegorized in a young white man's fear of a black ¶ female. For Kant, terrifying expressions of the ¶ sublime were the province of "the Spaniard" as ¶ a national type. The sublime is in these latter in- ¶ stances some thing or body which is imagined to ¶ be threatening, the experience of which can be in- ¶ tegral not only to the experiencing, aestheticizing ¶ subject's integration or identity-formation, but also ¶ to a general classification of the physiologies and ¶ feelings of all those noble, splendid, or terrifying ¶ "others" encountered with growing imperialist ¶ and nationalist claims. Finally, while it may serve ¶ as a basis for power and mastery within aesthetic ¶ ideology, the sublime is also a figure for the ter- ¶ ror of images and passions which transgress the ¶ "natural" orders of society. In aesthetic discourse, ¶ the threat of this excess must be simultaneously ¶ provoked by, contained within, and sacrificed to ¶ the economy of sublime vision. ¶ And here another, far less transcendent but ¶ perhaps more troubling, possibility emerges. The ¶ sublime is not simply a moment of terror and ¶ privation on the way to a recovery of self-pos- ¶ session and mastery (or recognition of oneself ¶ within a transcendent symbolic order); rather, ¶ the sublime exceeds this drama of identification ¶ and marks the sheer ecstasy of the image of for- ¶ eign bodies. Making the sublime less terrifying ¶ or obscure is the business of aesthetic discourse; ¶ in Burke's Enquiry, the aesthetic works to contain passions, direct desire, and steady what is al- ¶ ready an unsteady and passionate eye for excess. ¶ In this work, there is not only no end, but by def- ¶ inition, no satisfaction.

### DA- Alt

#### Aesthetic explanations mean alternative

Thompson ’13 (Lanny – Prof @ Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico)“Aesthetics and Empire: The Sense of Feminine Beauty in the Making of the US Imperial Archipelago” http://cultureandhistory.revistas.csic.es/index.php/cultureandhistory/article/viewArticle/36/142#S0009

We have seen that the connection between aesthetics and empire can be demonstrated by a careful examination of the imperial sense of beauty, the economy of colonial desire, and the complex of visuality. First, imperial aesthetics objectified the women of the islands through photographs and textual descriptions which portrayed their perceived beauty or ugliness. The portrayals of lovely feminine figures painted sympathetic, although distinct, pictures of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Hawai`i. These islands of women had their own charms, their own story, their own future. In contrast, the representations of the ugly feminine figure of the Philippines were steeped with disillusion and racial deprecation. A sense of beauty was integral to these representations and provided important imaginaries for US political and cultural hegemony. More than a simple justification, however, the depictions of women suggested certain paradigms that paralleled the particular strategies of rule in each site. The deployment of a sense of beauty was an active engagement with the world and expressed the will to possess and govern colonies, albeit in different ways.¶ Second, the economy of colonial desire expressed the dynamic political transactions between colonizing and colonized men by means of representations of women. The aesthetics of feminine beauty accompanied the evaluation of the relative attributes of colonized men and their capacity to govern. “Effeminism,” that discourse which discredited colonized men by stressing their lack of masculinity, was the strongest in the Philippines where the ugliness of the women signaled their degradation and the savagery of their menfolk. In sharp contrast, the virtuous and beautiful Cuban women were paired with brave and patriotic men of masculine valor and honor. In Puerto Rico, the women were deemed beautiful and desirous, whether from the elite or the working classes. The elite men, however, seemed plagued by an effeminate and antiquated civilization, and were neither vigorous nor masculine enough to govern themselves. In Hawai`i, the representations of women were highly eroticized, emphasizing their exotic nature and sexual availability. Hawai`ian men were creatures of nature and politically inconsequential; the men who ruled in Hawai`i were settlers from the United States. The economy of colonial desire was not constant, rather continuously negotiated and expressed in variable gendered representations.¶ Finally, imperial visuality was a way of seeing accompanied by diverse, concrete engagements with the colonies. It classified and ordered peoples according to their level of civilization and capacity for self-government. It normalized the various forms of colonial dominion. In this process, aesthetics informed the strategies of rule. The photographs, reinforced with textual descriptions, expressed a sense of feminine beauty or ugliness that were related to the real governments established. In Cuba, brave, honorable men, accompanied by their virtuous women, were granted a formally independent state, reduced to a protectorate. In the Philippines, images of scowling women and naked or violent men suggested that they were savages to be brutally subdued; here colonial administrators would first pacify by force of arms and then rule with the intent to civilize and build a modern nation. In pretty Puerto Rico, weak men could only hope to collaborate while colonial administrators ruled an “unincorporated territory.” Finally, in Hawai’i, hegemonic haoles realized their fantasy of dominion through the settlement of and hegemony over the first US overseas incorporated territory.¶

#### Beauty will just be used as a tool to advance sexist, racist, classist notions by those in power

Barber ‘8 (Kristen – PhD Sociology @ USC) “THE WELL-COIFFED MAN: Class, Race, and Heterosexual Masculinity in the Hair Salon” http://www.jstor.org/stable/27821663

A Stylish and Classed Haircut The men at Shear Style also set themselves apart as members of a particular class by describing salon hair care as important to the accomplishment of a "stylish" white professional-class embodiment. They conflate salon hair care with "stylish," customized, and contemporary haircuts. For example, Mack notes, "[If I] want something a little more stylish, I'll come to the salon because the salon develops more current styles [and] different techniques [that are] more relevant." The men understand the salon as a space in which they are able to purchase current trends in hair, and they attribute the ability to deliver this style to the women hairstylists whom they suggest have a "high taste level" and are highly skilled. The men trust their stylists and take comfort in knowing they will get a "good" haircut each and every time they come to the salon. "I know that I'm going to have a consistently good haircut every time I go [to the salon]," one man told me. This consistency gives the men "peace of mind," and alleviates the worry and the stress they feel when they have their hair cut elsewhere. The men's desires for aesthetic enhancement are potentially threaten ing to their masculinity since, as men, their sense of self-worth is not sup posed to be tied to how they look. To counteract this potential threat, the men claim they do not want to look stylish for themselves; rather they need to look good to succeed professionally. They construct their purchase of beauty work in the salon as a practice that helps them to compete in the workplace and to persuade their clients that they are professional, responsible, and will do the job well. Tom says, I mean, you know, I have clients. That means before they become clients, I have to win them over. Now who are they going to go with? The person who has . . . this great appearance package [pointing to himself] including grooming, style, professionalism, mannerism . . Who . are they going to go with, that person, or are they going to go with somebody who looks like they came in and dressed by accident or [that they are] indifferent about their hair? Tom equates appearance with professionalism, explaining that he has to look a particular way, which includes "grooming [and] style," to be success ful with his business clients. Hamilton also feels pressured because he works with "wealthy clients." "When you walk in a room and there are bil lionaires sitting there, you need to uphold the same appearance," he told me. These men suggest that there are unwritten appearance rules in the workplace for men as well as women (Dellinger and Williams 1997) and that these rules require them to purchase beauty work in the hair salon. This resonates with Luciano's (2001) study, which links men's appearance standards to the work that they do and describes professional men as likely to invest in appearance-enhancing practices because of their interactions with clients and customers. Like the women in Gimlin's (1996) research, the men at Shear Style embed the meaning of their beauty work in profes sionalism. That is, their purchase of beauty services in the hair salon becomes about fulfilling what they interpret as expectations of white professional-class masculinity. Few of these clients directly acknowledge the role class and occupation play in both their desire for and ability to purchase beauty work and "style" in the hair salon. Kerry, a 50-year-old white marketer, first describes the typical male client in the salon as "somebody who has more money than somebody who can only afford 10 dollars." However, he quickly reassesses his answer and decides, "It doesn't matter how rich or how poor you are, you have budgets and you have allocations. And some people who make less money will spend more on entertainment than peo ple who make a lot of money. What's your priority[?]" In this way, Kerry marks himself, and the other men at Shear Style, as distinct in "priority," not privilege. This works to erase class privilege, although the purchase of salon hair care is made possible by the men's income and is rooted in the ability to succeed in a professional white-collar occupation. ¶ The men also solidify their class status by again distancing themselves ¶ from the masculinity they associate with the "old school" barbershop. ¶ They reject the barbershop as a place where men purchase mass produced ¶ hairstyles by an out-of-date barber. For example, one man told me, "I ¶ think there is a difference; I think she [his stylist] cuts hair a little bit bet ¶ ter [than a barber]." A good, stylish haircut is one that is current and mod ¶ ern, and is in contrast with the haircut the men feel they would receive ¶ from "old barber[s]." "The male barber is just bad," Hamilton exclaims, ¶ "80-year-old barbers who can't see just chop your hair." These men ¶ believe that white professional-class men do not need to get their hair cut ¶ at the barbershop since they can afford the "superior" and "customized" ¶ work of a salon stylist. Rather, they claim that working-class men pur ¶ chase what they consider the inferior haircuts of the barbershop. As Evan ¶ says, "I can't see a mechanic working at, or a grease-monkey working at ¶ a Jiffy-Lube, or something like that, going to a shop that charges 65 bucks ¶ for a haircut." Evan differentiates the clients of the salon and barbershop ¶ in terms of class, and also sets the men salon clients up as superior by ¶ derogatorily referring to white working-class men as "grease-monkeys." ¶ The men clients at Shear Style contrast the salon with the barbershop to ¶ justify their presence in a "women's" space. They refer to the barbershop ¶ as "old" and out of date, allowing them to position themselves in contrast ¶ as contemporary stylish men who rightfully seek the beauty work of ¶ women. Both the haircuts and the space of the barbershop are associated ¶ with an out-of-date style. For example, in justifying his preference for the ¶ salon, Mack again connects the barbershop with a pass? aggressive and ¶ misogynist masculinity, ¶ [The barbershop's] got the owner's old boxing gloves up on the wall, black ¶ and white photos from being in the war, the naugahyde seats, [and] the pile ¶ of Playboys in the corner ... I guess it just depends on how machismo I ¶ was feeling at the time, if I wanted to go "Grrr" [pretending to be "machismo" ¶ as he furrows his brow, grunts, and shakes his head from side to side] and ¶ go old school [to the barbershop] or you know, if I wanted to come here [to ¶ the salon]. ¶ Mack genders the barbershop and describes it is a place of the past with ¶ its "black and white photos from the war" and "old school" haircuts. He ¶ classes the barbershop by associating it with the cheap material of "nau ¶ gahyde seats" and with a working-class masculinity that is involved in the ¶ physical aspect of war and the aggressive sport of boxing. Neil also classed ¶ the barbershop and its customers by describing it as having "no music, ¶ vinyl flooring, and Auto Week magazines." By contrasting themselves with ¶ the traditional "machismo" barbershop which they say does not deliver its ¶ supposed working-class customers with "style," the men at Shear Style ¶ construct themselves as a class of "new men": progressive, stylish, and ¶ professional.